Tactical Decision-Making: Community Organizers Describe Ethical Considerations in Social Action Campaigns by Hardina, Donna et al.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 March Article 5 
2015 
Tactical Decision-Making: Community Organizers Describe Ethical 
Considerations in Social Action Campaigns 
Donna Hardina 
Fresno State - California State University, donnah@csufresno.edu 
Matthew A. Jendian 
California State University - Fresno, matthewj@csufresno.edu 
Catherine G. White 
UC Davis, cgaroupa@ucdavis.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hardina, Donna; Jendian, Matthew A.; and White, Catherine G. (2015) "Tactical Decision-Making: 
Community Organizers Describe Ethical Considerations in Social Action Campaigns," The Journal of 
Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 42 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol42/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more 
information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 
Tactical Decision-Making:  
Community Organizers Describe Ethical  
Considerations in Social Action Campaigns
donna hardina
Department of Social Work Education 
California State University, Fresno
Mathew ari Jendian
Department of Sociology 
California State University, Fresno
catherine garouPa white
Geography Graduate Group 
University of California Davis
Social work curriculum on social action-oriented organizing 
methods is often devoid of content on the day-to-day role of the 
organizer in recruiting diverse participants, facilitating group 
decision-making, and planning and implementing campaigns. 
Little attention is paid to how tactical decisions are made and 
how the ethical implications of these decisions are weighed. In this 
study, professional organizers were interviewed about how they 
viewed their work, their relationships with their constituents, and 
the values and ethical principles used to make tactical decisions. 
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Community organizers engaged in social action often 
choose from a range of strategies and tactics that can include 
consensus-oriented actions to protests and civil disobedi-
ence (Staples, 2004). Contest or confrontation tactics are often 
used to dramatize issues, attract allies to a cause, and force an 
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opponent to negotiate. They can also be used to intimidate 
targets and throw the other side off-guard (Homan, 2011). For 
example, some organizers believe that the seriousness of the 
issue (risk of death or injury to innocent populations) could 
require the escalation of confrontation-related tactics such as 
the use of civil disobedience (Mondros, 2005). Conway (2003) 
defines civil disobedience as “a specific form of extra-parlia-
mentary political action involving the deliberate, principled, 
and public breaking of a law that is perceived to be unjust” (p. 
508). 
In some cases, participants may actually intend to put 
themselves at risk of arrest as a means of calling attention to 
social problems or political oppression (McAdam & Tarrow, 
2000). In addition to arrest, participants in social action cam-
paigns may also risk losing their jobs, harassment, or physical 
harm by opponents or the police. Given the possible ramifi-
cations associated with using these methods, little discussion 
has taken place in the social work literature about the ethical 
implications involved in applying these tactics. In addition, 
there are few resources available that assist newly employed 
organizers or social work students in reconciling differences 
between tactical procedures used in social action campaigns, 
personal values, and the ethical principles contained in the 
National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics 
(2008). Curriculum in schools of social work on community 
organizing often excludes content on social action in favor of 
less controversial approaches that rely on consensus-building 
such as community development and social planning (Fisher 
& Corciullo, 2011). Consequently, social work students often 
have a limited understanding of how tactical decisions are 
made in social action campaigns and who makes them (Mott, 
2008). 
This is especially problematic for social workers em-
ployed as community organizers in grass-roots organizations 
that engage in social action. Often ethical reference points are 
limited to Saul Alinsky’s (1971) ethics of “means and ends” 
(Reisch & Lowe, 2000). Alinsky, in his description of how tac-
tical decisions should be made, implied that efforts to put 
pressure on opponents are always justified if they are used to 
help disadvantaged communities gain power. However, most 
74    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
contemporary community organizations influenced by 
Alinsky’s approach define appropriate tactics much more nar-
rowly, focusing on legal, nonviolent methods and using civil 
disobedience sparingly (Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 2010). Given 
that organizing work often involves complex issues and mul-
tiple individuals and groups, efforts to resolve ethical dilem-
mas are often made on a case-by-case or situational basis in 
consultation with the organization’s constituents and coalition 
partners (Barretti, 2009; Ganz, 2009). However, for an inexpe-
rienced organizer, it may be difficult to determine “where to 
draw the line” in terms of risky tactics, especially when working 
with groups who may have different perspectives about using 
methods that may not be either safe or legal (Conway, 2003).
In this paper, the processes through which community 
organizers and their constituents make tactical decisions in 
grass-roots organizations are explored. Qualitative interviews 
were conducted with 13 community organizers. The research 
questions focused on how organizers employed in social 
action organizations make ethical decisions and what individ-
uals and groups are consulted in the decision-making process. 
Participants were also asked to identify situations in which 
confrontation-oriented tactics should be used and to describe 
the ethical implications of those actions. Staples (2004) defines 
social action as “bring[ing] people together to convince, pres-
sure, or coerce external decision-makers to meet collective 
goals either to act in a specific manner or to modify or stop 
certain activities” (p. 9). Grass-roots organizing originates in 
local communities and decisions about organizing campaigns 
include “those who are directly impacted by the issues that the 
group is fighting to change” (Schutz & Sandy, 2011, p. 27). 
The Setting
All of the organizers interviewed were employed in the 
San Joaquin Valley in central California at the time of the in-
terviews. This region is primarily rural, but contains a number 
of small and mid-size cities. The San Joaquin Valley has his-
torically been an entry point for immigrants and refugees from 
Mexico, Central and South America, China, and Southeast 
Asia (Kohl-Arenas, Martinez Nateras, & Taylor, 2014). The 
primary industry is agriculture, with many large farm 
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operations located in surrounding rural areas; the majority of 
the population is Latino. However, the political establishment 
in the region is politically conservative and primarily White. 
The San Joaquin Valley of California is also home to the 
United Farm Workers (UFW). Although the UFW successfully 
fought for the right of farm laborers to form unions and for 
the implementation of state regulations to ensure that workers 
have access to good sanitation, clean water, and rest breaks, 
there is much work still to be done to ensure that farm workers 
and their families obtain economic security (Ganz, 2009). Many 
of the Latino farm workers are undocumented, have almost 
no legal rights, are at constant risk of exploitation and live in 
fear of arrest by local police or immigration officials and de-
portation to Mexico and Central America (King & Punti, 2012; 
“Sober but unlicensed,” 2011). While agriculture creates enor-
mous wealth in this region, the farm labor force is paid sub-
sistence wages. Kohl-Arenas et al. (2014) succinctly describe 
historic patterns of discrimination and inequality in the San 
Joaquin Valley: 
Many immigrants first found their way to the region 
with the promise of finding a better life, working on 
valley farms and saving enough to support their families 
both here and abroad. Yet, since before the California 
Gold Rush racist immigration, land ownership and 
labor policies and practices prevented immigrants 
from owning land, marrying, educating their children, 
and participating in political life. (p. 8)
Undocumented immigrants may not legally work unless 
they have qualified for the temporary Deferred Action 
program implemented by the Obama administration in 2012 
(National Immigration Law Center, 2013). While California 
has passed legislation that permits undocumented students to 
attend college and qualify for financial aid, few of these stu-
dents actually complete high school and have access only to 
marginal, “off-the-book” employment (Gonzalez, 2011). Drop-
out rates are high for most children of color, with many stu-
dents attending segregated, underfunded schools that provide 
a poor quality of education (Stifter, 2013). Consequently, 
unemployment rates are high due in part to the continued 
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reliance on agriculture and the failure of local efforts to attract 
diverse industries. According to the California Department of 
Public Health (2014), the San Joaquin Valley contains census 
tracts with high rates of concentrated poverty, neighborhoods 
in which over 40% of the residents live below the poverty line. 
Poverty rates are highest in communities of color. While most 
of these neighborhoods are in rural farming communities in 
which most residents are farmworkers, some urban neighbor-
hoods also have high rates of concentrated poverty (Cytron, 
2009).
The San Joaquin Valley contains census tracts with high 
rates of concentrated poverty, neighborhoods in which over 
40% of the residents live below the poverty line (California 
Department of Public Health, 2014). People who live in com-
munities in which concentrated poverty is high are likely to 
experience numerous harmful effects:
Poor people are more likely to live in dangerous 
or under-resourced environments and to work in 
hazardous conditions, with greater risk of injury, and 
greater exposure to pesticides, lead, and outdoor air 
pollution. Low income people are more likely to be 
uninsured and to have limited access to quality health 
care; are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases like 
diabetes and heart disease, acute and chronic stress, 
and to die prematurely. (p. 1)
Indeed, Valley residents are assaulted by multiple sources 
of pollution in the land, water, and soil. According to recent 
data prepared by California’s Office of Environmental Health 
Hazard Assessment (2014), about a quarter of the Valley’s 
census tracts are among the most polluted and most vulnera-
ble in the state. The San Joaquin Valley air basin competes with 
Los Angeles for most polluted in the nation, with its major met-
ropolitan areas regularly ranking in the top 10 most polluted 
for particulate matter and ozone (American Lung Association, 
2014). The eight-county San Joaquin Valley has some of the 
most contaminated aquifers in the nation (Dubrovsky, Kratzer, 
Brown, Gronberg, & Burow, 1998). Much of this contamina-
tion is from nitrates, which are linked to the agricultural 
sector’s heavy use of fertilizers and flood irrigation, with 
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confined animal feeding operations also contributing (Moore 
et al., 2011). Thus the Valley’s bountiful agricultural produc-
tion comes laced with rampant concentrated poverty and high 
levels of toxic pollution, an everyday reality that organizers 
work within whatever the cause.
Methods
Thirteen organizers were interviewed over a six year 
period, 2005 – 2011. Although the study was originally concep-
tualized as using snowball sampling, few organizers referred 
to one of the authors as prospective participants agreed to be 
interviewed, due to the sensitive nature of the research ques-
tions. In the course of the study, the research team was expand-
ed to include two local organizing experts. All three authors 
employed their personal networks in order to recruit partici-
pants for a purposive sample of urban and rural organizers in 
the region under study. 
Of the 13 organizers interviewed, eight were Latino, 1 was 
African American, and 4 were White. There were 4 females and 
9 males. Three of the respondents were Mexican immigrants; 
2 of these interviews were conducted in Spanish. One respon-
dent held an MSW degree and all but three of the respondents 
had attended or graduated from college. Organizational affili-
ations ranged from employment in local chapters of national 
organizations to positions in very small, local nonprofit com-
munity organizations operated by one or two staff members. 
Two of the respondents worked on environmental issues, one 
was a union organizer, one worked with youth, two worked on 
variety of urban issues, and one worked primarily on behalf of 
African Americans. One respondent combined organizing on 
policing issues with a focus on immigration and three worked 
primarily with immigrants. Two of the respondents were 
retired from organizing work and spoke retrospectively; one of 
these organizers had been employed by organizations focused 
on Alinsky-style organizing, while the second had worked for 
the UFW during the early part of his career and was later in-
volved in organizing in low-income, urban communities. 
The poverty of the residents is directly related to the struc-
ture, stability, and financing of local community organizations. 
While some of the organizers for this study have been or were 
previously employed by established community organiza-
tions, several of the respondents worked for poorly funded 
or marginal organizations and often raised their own salaries 
or worked second jobs to support their work. These itinerant 
organizers worked within their own ethnic communities to 
promote social justice and civil liberties. 
The qualitative research questions focused on how tacti-
cal decisions were made, the people typically included in de-
cision-making, ethical frameworks for making decisions, the 
consequences of making a bad decision, whether any tactical 
methods could be viewed as unethical, and whether and in 
what circumstances civil disobedience should be used as a tac-
tical method. 
A process of open-coding was used to organize the inter-
view data into themes (Berg, 2009). In order to increase the 
trustworthiness of the data, an audit trail was maintained 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2001). Data were analyzed separately by two 
of the authors and differences among the two analyses were 
reconciled. Interviews were conducted until the data reached 
“saturation,” the point at which the information collected 
became repetitive and did not result in additional categories 
or reinterpretation of the data (Padgett, 2008). 
Results
Respondents perceived tactical decision-making to be an 
interactive and dynamic process, involving both the organiz-
ers and constituency group members likely to be involved in 
carrying out the action. However, the respondents had strong 
convictions about ethical decision-making and the role of or-
ganizing staff in making sure the preferences of constituents 
were respected and any risks to participants during organizing 
campaigns were kept to a minimum. Six themes were identi-
fied in the data: (1) Tactics are situational; (2) Tactical decisions 
should be made by constituents; (3) Tactical decisions should 
be made by consensus; (4) Morality, faith-based values, and 
personal principles are important for the success of the or-
ganizing process; (5) Ethical organizing involves minimizing 
risks; and (6) Civil disobedience should only be used when no 
other options are possible.
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Tactics are Situational
Nearly all of the respondents described tactical decision-
making as depending on the situation at hand, the context in 
which the decision is made, the resources possessed by the or-
ganization, and the amount of economic and political power 
held by members of the constituency group. Several of the or-
ganizers described the process as “strategic,” making sure it 
is going to be worth doing and that it “falls in line with the 
organization’s mission and vision.” An organizer working on 
environmental issues said:
To me, it’s kind of difficult to talk about tactics in a 
vacuum apart from broader strategies and the social 
situation. You figure out what you need. I’m sure that 
other organizers have talked about this. You have 
relationships to build with each other. You figure out 
what you need and what your goals are and a strategy 
to get there, escalating certain pressure tactics to reach 
those goals. 
One organizer described her approach to developing tacti-
cal methods for an organizing campaign in the following way:
As far as the issue goes, I always try to focus on the 
need. Another thing is, when I try to choose an issue 
to organize, lots of times they are emergent situations, 
for example, when I find out that a law is going to be 
approved that is going to benefit or cause damage to a 
large group of immigrants, that is an issue for me to try 
and organize.
Although respondents emphasized that the choice of indi-
vidual tactics should not be pre-determined by the organizer, 
several conceded that the organizing model used by the or-
ganization in which they were employed often served as a 
framework for making tactical decisions. For example, a union 
organizer described his organizing approach:
There is a certain set of standard outreach mobilizing 
tactics that we are used to, the places that we organize 
and the people that we organize. There is a certain 
standard, stock set of tactics that we are going to use 
to educate and agitate people… Beyond that I think 
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it depends… You have an actual target or opponent 
or some sort of outcome that you’re trying to reach, a 
point you are trying to make with your action. 
Assuring a successful outcome was also a consideration 
in the decision-making process. One respondent described his 
desired outcome as obtaining something “usually for people 
left out of the system or [who] should have got something that 
they weren’t getting.” Some of the respondents also spoke 
about weighing the costs or consequences of tactical decisions 
against the potential benefits of goal achievement. However, a 
few organizers felt goal achievement was not the only consid-
eration that determined if the organizing effort were success-
ful; the degree to which members of the constituency group 
were affected by their engagement in social change was also 
important. For example, one respondent stated that an orga-
nizing effort could be considered successful, “If I see that the 
people that participated in the organizing drive are much more 
empowered. If I see they are asking more questions.” 
Tactical Decisions Should be Made by Constituents 
Nearly all of the respondents described how tactical de-
cisions were made by focusing on the role of constituents. 
Constituents were often described as the primary decision-
makers for most types of decisions. One respondent said or-
ganizing decisions were made by “the people who live in the 
community. I get feedback from them and basically they’re the 
ones who make the decisions.” Some of the respondents de-
scribed the participation of constituents as essential because 
they are the people who carry out the action. Consequently, a 
good tactic was viewed as one that constituents were comfort-
able with or that “fit” with the experiences and values of par-
ticipants. Tactics that did not meet with the approval of the con-
stituents or were not appropriate to the situation were viewed 
as likely to backfire. One respondent described a “bad tactic” 
used at a rally that focused on [then] California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s decision to veto legislation allowing 
undocumented immigrants to have driver’s licenses:
One thing that we believed to be simple, for example, 
to break piñatas that contained the governor’s name, 
or to burn or throw away video tapes the governor 
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had been in, we believed it was going to be an action 
that would be morally accepted by the people. And we 
later figured out it was not as so; many mothers and 
children were frightened by that. They saw it as being 
very violent. 
For many of the respondents, the facilitation of inclusive 
decision-making processes was viewed as one of the primary 
ethical responsibilities of the organizer. For example, one re-
spondent felt it was essential that any campaign be “lead by 
the people for other people.” A number of respondents felt 
this principle was critical for recruiting and retaining partic-
ipants because “when you do something that’s staff driven, 
the leaders don’t take it and you continue pushing it, it is de-
moralizing for leaders. You don’t build anything and you lose 
people.” A few of the respondents reported that they also con-
sulted mentors or community leaders before making strategic 
decisions. One respondent gave a detailed rationale for the in-
clusion of constituents in decision-making and also described 
the role of the organizer in providing background information 
about the situation to be addressed:
For example, when we wanted to get the police to 
stop calling the border control. We have to change the 
policy. Having to get the people to understand how the 
system works. Having to get the people to the table to 
negotiate with the [police] chief. Having to come up 
with language for the policy. Having them understand 
the language so that they are able to change the policy. 
I would feel like they are the ones I work for. If I don’t 
explain to them what’s going on, how it happens, what 
is going on, the impact, I’m not doing my job. It’s easier 
to do it myself. But I want them to take over if I’m not 
around. They will be able to call the chief.
Decisions Should Be Made by Consensus
Most of the respondents described tactical decision-mak-
ing as taking place in the context of dialogue among the orga-
nizer and constituency group members in order to achieve a 
consensus. One respondent provided a rationale for making 
collective decisions that focused on group maintenance: 
“What happens is that in reality, if one sole individual decides 
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what to do, then there is no organization.” A youth organizer 
provided another rationale for constituent involvement as:
making sure that we’re not putting them in jeopardy 
for any decision that is made on a tactic, discussing it 
as an organizer and the folks we organize so that we all 
have a good understanding and making sure we make 
a collective decision.
 
An organizer for a congregation-based organizing effort 
described the process as interactive; the organizer must 
balance the views of leaders and constituency group members. 
Respondents also indicated the dialogue process helped shape 
and refine the decisions made because there was often a di-
versity of viewpoints that should be considered. An immigra-
tion organizer felt that dialogue was essential because “[the] 
interchange of points of views, precisely helps to understand 
the problem in its totality or at least in its great majority. Why? 
Because different points of views can help to discover some-
thing that I do not see.” Another organizer stated: 
You know sometimes you may start out with an 
ideal decision, but once you open it up and have a 
conversation and everybody gets to discuss whatever 
that had to do with that decision or not even about 
the decision, but about the material, the topic, or the 
activity or the situation, then at the end of that you 
have a more “real” decision to make. 
Some of the respondents described how they went about 
facilitating consensus-oriented decision-making. A former or-
ganizer who had a long career working for a number of social 
action organizations said: 
We might involve advisors—other people from other 
organizations who had had similar experiences in 
how things would work, sort of trainers, consultants, 
that sort of thing—people from other neighborhoods 
or communities who had done that so that they could 
say yeah this can work. We could do this. The ultimate 
decision was with the people themselves. 
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Another respondent described the inclusion of additional 
groups in decision-making as a “long process” because “we 
dedicated time to inter-ethnic work. Bringing groups of im-
migrants and nonimmigrants together. We need the support 
of non-immigrant groups. Issues of non-immigrants need to 
be addressed.”
The Importance of Morality, Faith-based Values, and Personal  
Principles in the Organizing Process
When respondents were asked to describe ethical decision-
making, in addition to the importance of constituent inclusion, 
many focused on the role of morality and faith-based values 
as well as personal principles. Four of the respondents worked 
with faith-based organizations and a fifth routinely worked 
with church groups. One of these respondents described how 
faith inspired the organization’s choices: “one of our pieces 
is going to be Micah which is undoing injustice so … we are 
going to be asking officials to work with us, make a more just 
society, through scripture that speaks to us.” Another respon-
dent spoke about her parent organization’s religious commit-
ment to pacifism: “In general, people we work with are against 
violence. Based on that principle, we don’t want to perpetuate 
anything that we’re against.”  
Additional values and ethical principles incorporated into 
the organizing process included liberty, justice, the NASW 
Code of Ethics, and personal commitment to help the poor, 
the oppressed, or members of the organizer’s own community. 
One respondent, an environmental organizer, talked about the 
values that motivated him. “You want the movement to show 
an example for the next generation and it’s all about dignity, 
it’s all about democracy and all about peace. It’s all about 
justice and you want that to be consistent in your actions.” The 
one respondent in the study with an MSW degree stressed the 
importance of professional values:
I know the Social Work Code of Ethics. The ones 
about doing no harm. The ones that are technical like 
confidentiality. I try to find ways not to be stymied by 
those. Organizing needs to be real open so that there are 
no hidden agendas. I try to get approval from them so 
that I can use their names. That we are all in agreement.
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For several of the organizers, the negative effects of doing 
nothing about social injustices that harmed individuals and 
families or proactively “taking the side” of people who were 
marginalized were the primary motivators in taking action. 
Several of the respondents described their commitment to 
helping members of their own ethnic communities improve 
their economic status or overcome oppression. One of these 
respondents said that as a Chicano, he felt that “the strongest 
influence I will have will be with all those youth that I can 
relate to the most.”
Commitment to helping marginalized community 
members was universal among the respondents, regardless 
of ethnic background or length of time working in the San 
Joaquin Valley. One respondent, originally from the Midwest, 
described himself as utilitarian, believing in the greatest good 
for the greatest number. He described his views about the mo-
rality of tactical methods used in environmental organizing in 
the following way:
We knew the woman with five kids, all of whom had 
asthma, and she was having respiratory problems 
herself. She didn’t need a study done to tell her to move 
…. She didn’t want to be exposed to more trucks. So if 
you take all that seriously, the question of what’s right 
or wrong; it’s so clearly what’s right. The only thing 
that’s wrong is to choose the wrong tactic and mess up 
the strategy. I’ve never really thought about morality 
in terms of breaking windows or something. Everyone 
talks about that. That’s never been an issue for me. 
Another respondent also had an “ends justify the means” 
approach, describing his ethical framework in terms of tactical 
methods that he had used effectively in previous campaigns; 
“militant, nonviolence, noncooperation, and disruption gets 
results and wins concessions.”
Ethical Organizing Involves Minimizing Risks
The organizers identified a number of unethical tactics 
including violence, property destruction, slander, manipula-
tion, degrading opponents, lying, name calling, and the use of 
profanity. Nearly all of the respondents talked about methods 
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they utilized to minimize or do no harm to participants in or-
ganizing efforts. The philosophy of “do no harm” had a dual 
focus, ensuring that constituency group members were fully in-
formed about or protected from negative consequences as-
sociated with their actions and making sure opponents were 
not harmed in the course of the organizing effort, particularly 
when pressure tactics were utilized. 
The organizers interviewed were especially concerned 
about ensuring that constituents were fully informed about 
any risks they may face in the organizing effort. Providing this 
information to members of the constituency group was viewed 
as the responsibility of the organizer; ensuring the safety of 
participants was also viewed by respondents as part of the 
organizer’s role. For example, one respondent said, “One is a 
bad leader, he who by his actions does not measure the con-
sequences that they may have on the people.” Many of the 
respondents specifically mentioned potential manipulation 
by the organizer as a form of unethical practice, misinforming 
or failing to inform participants about both the positive and 
negative consequences. Another respondent stated: 
It is anti-ethical for example, that you know beforehand 
that you are heading a protest and you know that up 
ahead there are a group of agitators or police agents 
waiting for you with clubs in their hands, ready to 
strike and you know that your people are unprotected 
[and] you nonetheless still insist on taking them to get 
beat.
Several respondents described the potential consequenc-
es of using confrontation-related tactics or civil disobedience 
as much more severe for low-income people and undocu-
mented immigrants than middle and upper-income activists. 
Consequences for undocumented immigrants can include loss 
of employment, deportation, and potential harm to family 
members. A Latina respondent differentiated between poten-
tial consequences for herself and for her constituents:
It doesn’t affect me. It affects others. I have the privilege 
of being an American. I own a home. Other people don’t 
have those luxuries. The biggest [negative consequence] 
is being in jail without an attorney because we didn’t 
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plan it correctly. Being deported for them. Coming up 
with the fines. Missing work. The consequences for 
our people are greater than people [middle income 
activists] who got arrested for the [protest against a 
retail outlet chain that uses sweatshop labor]. Missing 
one day of work, when it’s seasonal work. 
A youth organizer who is also a person of color described 
his concerns when participating in civil disobedience that in-
volved trespassing on private property and “people chaining 
themselves to things.” He felt that potential repercussions 
would not be the same for all participants:
Especially 'cause a lot of us were like people of color 
and stuff like that and low income folks—But there 
were some other folks who were White and kind of 
affluent and they all were really down for it. But we 
were hesitant because of our backgrounds because we 
knew if anything was to go down we would probably 
be punished more severely than other folks. 
Some of the organizers were also concerned about the 
well-being of their opponents; the respondents talked about 
making sure there were limits in terms of how they challenged 
or even spoke to those people who were the targets of social 
change efforts. For example, one respondent said:
We had a strong sense that even though we would 
personalize issues and even though we would have 
enemies [we wouldn’t demean them]. Even though 
they would speak in that language, I never liked it. We 
always said ‘Today’s opponent is tomorrow’s ally.’ We 
never wanted, just pragmatically, we never wanted to 
depersonalize a person.
Another respondent stated he felt it was important to 
protect “by-standers or otherwise innocent people implicat-
ed or involved in the outcome of what you’re doing.” One 
respondent whose organization typically used confrontation 
tactics to pressure opponents described both ethical and prag-
matic considerations given to various tactical options:
Are you in a point in your campaign where you have 
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exposed your target and now that you think that you 
should start putting their picture up everywhere and 
personalizing it or maybe slandering them a little bit 
more? Does that seem appropriate or is that going to 
backfire on you because a lot of people would be more 
defensive of that target? Another thing would be, for 
example, if you came up with an idea like “how about 
we do a hunger strike or civil disobedience directed at 
this target?” It would be unethical to force other people 
to do it if they did not believe in it because you are now 
asking people to put themselves at risk. 
Use Civil Disobedience When No Other Options Are Possible
Respondents described civil disobedience as specific 
actions taken to challenge unjust laws. One of the organizers 
described it as “intentionally breaking a law for some sort of 
broader purpose, concern, [or] broader moral considerations.” 
Most organizers interviewed felt civil disobedience was just 
one of the tools to be considered in the organizing process. 
Several respondents felt that civil disobedience should be used 
only “when you’ve exhausted all of your legal remedies and 
you’ve built a campaign where you’ve tried every respectable 
mechanism to get your point across.” Other respondents be-
lieved it was necessary to use civil disobedience in order to 
gain leverage on opponents or force the opposition to come 
to the bargaining table. For example, one respondent defined 
civil disobedience “as breaking an unjust law….but at the same 
time accepting the consequences of breaking it, in order to call 
attention to that law and its consequences and its injustice and 
get it changed.”
The former UFW organizer interviewed gave the following 
rationale for using this type of tactical method: 
By and large, our society has a lot of laws promulgated 
or implemented by those in power. One of the reasons 
for that is to keep others from obtaining that kind of 
power. The only way you can fight against that is by 
some degree of civil disobedience.
 
An environmental organizer also focused on the role of 
civil disobedience in giving a voice to the powerless. He felt 
civil disobedience should be used:
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When there’s no other way, you know, when you can’t 
negotiate because they’re not listening, they are not 
letting you in to sit at the table, they’re not taking you 
serious[ly] as a stakeholder, then you have to have a 
strong action that will gain attention to their unfairness.
Respondents repeatedly emphasized that they would need 
buy-in from participants before initiating any action that could 
involve arrest or any other type of risk. One respondent de-
scribed how he would solicit support from members of his or-
ganization to take action to address issues related to the use of 
excessive force against persons of color by local police:
I would again call people to the table and explain to 
them the amount of time, the number of years that we 
have been at this. The lives of our children. The integrity 
of our community. We [the city] were losing millions of 
dollars in excess lawsuits and this and that. The civil 
rights violations. The time was now. That I would have 
felt [that was] the time [to act]. Even if we had to go to 
the International Court to prove our point…. We can’t 
keep going like this. Something has to be done. I would 
have presented it like that.
Civil disobedience was also described as necessary because 
of the resource and power disadvantage often experienced by 
many small organizations representing people from low-in-
come backgrounds. Several respondents talked about difficul-
ties associated with obtaining permits or insurance for public 
marches or rallies that often involved fees that the organiza-
tions struggled to pay. In addition, they felt that public author-
ities were often uncooperative when they received requests 
for permits. This often made civil disobedience necessary. 
One respondent described a demonstration planned to protest 
the deaths of several farmworkers due to unsafe working 
conditions. 
We had all of the documents; we tried to submit to 
them in order. We had the check they had requested. 
We told them, you did not want to let me march, you do 
not want to let me practice my right to express myself 
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publicly, here are all the documents of all the agencies 
that we went to speak to and nobody responded, so 
let us march. That is what you wanted to do and we 
marched. That is a form of disobeying. Our pain was 
greater and our desire to demonstrate, what we felt, 
than the fear of being arrested. 
 The on-going oppression of communities of color was also 
referenced by one of the Latino organizers interviewed: 
Civil disobedience/direct action may be the tactic to 
take and people may feel uneasy about it, but that may 
be for fear of pushing the ‘envelope’ or ruffling some 
feathers, but I say we need to push that envelope and 
ruffle feathers because working ‘within’ the system has 
its limitations and just working ‘with’ the people that 
are oppressing us just doesn’t make sense. 
Conclusions
The organizers interviewed for this study used very clear 
ethical principles to guide their work, especially in terms of 
their responsibilities toward constituents and how organiz-
ing campaigns are planned and carried out. All of the re-
spondents described the ethical dimensions of their actions 
as incorporating principles similar to those contained in the 
NASW (2008) Code of Ethics: self-determination, respect for 
the individuals and community they served, empowerment, 
informed consent, and risk minimization. They also described 
how they developed organizing campaigns and selected tacti-
cal methods in response to situational demands and in con-
sultation with the constituents responsible for carrying them 
out. Such consultation promotes innovation, helps constitu-
ents develop leadership skills, and builds collective identity 
and a sense of personal empowerment among group members 
(Ganz, 2009). The group process also builds on the previous 
knowledge and experience of constituents and ensures that 
constituents are comfortable with the strategies and tactics 
chosen for the campaign. In this way, too, all participants are 
fully informed about the consequences and potential risks of 
social action. For all the organizers interviewed, civil disobedi-
ence was to be used when no other options were available or 
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when social class, ethnic background and/or the lack of po-
litical power narrowed their tactical choices. For financially 
strapped organizations, risks to participants were viewed as 
necessary in order to challenge authority.
The findings from this study may be somewhat unique 
in that the organizers interviewed represented marginalized 
groups from one region of the U.S., with a quarter of the re-
spondents running small, resource poor organizations; 9 of 
the 13 respondents were persons of color who were organiz-
ing in their own communities and identified heavily with the 
struggles experienced by their constituents. Although most of 
the respondents were college-educated, only one held a social 
work degree. However, the diversity of educational back-
grounds among the respondents is consistent with research 
documenting the education and training of professional orga-
nizers. According to Mott (2008), most organizers have limited, 
if any, professional training or received their education from 
public health, urban planning, or other professional programs. 
Recently, Boehm and Cnaan (2012) advocated for the devel-
opment of an alternative model of community organizing to be 
used by social workers that focuses on constituent strengths 
and assets. This model is also designed to involve constitu-
ents in deliberations concerning strategies and tactics and to 
construct organization-specific models of practice. However, 
as demonstrated in this research study, such a framework for 
practice is often used by grass-roots organizations engaging 
in social action and has been described in a number of studies 
of organizing practice by non-social workers including Ganz 
(2009), Polletta (2002), and Swarts (2008). More importantly, 
the principles and practices described by respondents are part 
of the “professional culture” associated with organizing work, 
disseminated in training institutes and through personal inter-
actions and meetings with others, on the job-learning guided 
by supervisors and mentors, or through praxis-based knowl-
edge (Conway, 2004; Freire, 1970). 
The findings from this study suggest that social work edu-
cators should develop curriculum that is consistent with and 
respectful of the day-to-day activities and knowledge held 
by both organizers and their constituents, incorporating best 
practices used in community organization and disseminated 
in training institutes with formal academic knowledge. In 
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addition, community practice instructors should not simply 
focus on such tasks as research, planning, and evaluation, but 
also teach organizing students the relational skills such as as-
sessment, interviewing, motivating people to take action, ne-
gotiation, and group work that are needed to recruit constitu-
ents and engage in organizing campaigns (ben Asher, 2003). 
There are only a handful of recent studies in the social 
work literature that involve interviews or surveys with com-
munity organizers about what they actually do (Bayne-Smith, 
Mizrahi, & Garcia, 2008; Mizrahi, 2006, 2007; Rothman & Zald, 
2008). Consequently, more research is needed that documents 
the actual practice of community organizing by social work 
practitioners as well as organizers without social work back-
grounds. Researchers should also pay more attention to how 
organizing work is conducted in communities of color and how 
tactical options may vary based on the ethnic backgrounds or 
social class of participants (Young Laing, 2009).
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